Myth vs. Reality of Process

So on one hand, we have what we say about what we do, and on the other hand, we have what we actually do. Generally these are short on resemblances, especially in the significant details, which really tend to make the difference. If this was not true, there would be no such thing as a field of psychology, since the implication of such an area of study is that there are aspects of the psyche, and of behavior, that need close study.

Note, as well, that after thousands of years of documented study, there are continuous refutations of positions formed just a decade or so before. Not only does it seem as though we've made little progress, but it also seems as though we continue to not do so.

That is why, when we come to need a practical model to decipher our behavior, or the behavior of others, so that we can make use of it, and build upon it, we generally have to rely on metaphors of some sort. Some metaphors are more useful than others in this domain, because there is a methodology for their use. Others seem more plausible because of parallels in other fields. For instance, Robert Dilts, another big-time NLP guru, designed a metaphor called Neurological Levels, loosely based on Gregory Bateson's reinterpretation of Bertrand Russell's "set theory."

According to set theory any set of elements cannot be a part of itself. For instance if there is a set called X, and Y and Z are are the elements of the set (i.e. X = {Y, Z}), then no way can either Y or Z be equal to X. That would be an illogical recursion, or something like that. A set, therefore, is on a higher order level than its elements, or rather, a higher logical level.

A system, for instance, is on a higher logical level than the elements of the system, just as it is often much more complex in behavior than its elements. Another way something can be on a higher logical level is if it is about something else. For instance, an explanation is on a higher logical level than the thing that's being explained. There can also be an explanation of the explanation, and so forth, i.e. theories about theories about theories. This isn't as complicated as it sounds, or it might be, but it's also much more common than you think. Anytime you say something like "I like what you said about that book," you are making a statement about a statement about a statement. In some ways it can be a very powerful way of thinking, since it allows you to, not only make choices about what you are thinking, and how, but also about how you think about how you think about something, and so forth.

It can also be dangerous, if you confuse levels of abstractions with others. A common trait of schizophrenia, for instance, is confusing a metaphor for the real thing, in other words, "flattening the abstract into the concrete." For instance, if one said something like, "you're poisoning me with your ideas," it can be a joke, or it can mean that certain of the ideas the other is expressing are irritating the speaker. But a schizophrenic may actually believe that the words spoken contain a lethal substance, which affects oneself physically. To some degree, we may all fall for this fallacy, but we have the reality testing abilities to negate it for the most part.

In Dilts' Neurological Levels, it is assumed that the higher levels somehow rule the levels beneath them. For instance, his hierarchy is:

A. Identity
B. Beliefs/Values
C. Capabilities
D. Behaviors
E. Environment

Therefore, Identity determines Beliefs and Values, which determines Capabilities, which determine Behaviors, which controls, to some extent, the environment. The chain of causality in the model is a bit more complex than can be handled in this space, but one should at least be able to understand how beliefs and values are a part of identity, and how behaviors can be determined by what one is capable of.

While it is arguable (and sometimes argued) that their are logical inconsistencies with the model, people have found it useful for explaining parts of human experience for practical purposes.

Kenneth Burke, a notable literary critic, who later became interested in analyzing actually communication and social systems, developed an analytical system which on first glance has nothing in common with Dilts' model. What is often described as his theory of Dramatism, uses the following categories to study communication behavior, or, as he puts it, Symbolic Action: Act, Scene, Agent, Agency and Purpose.

It just so happens, however that there is a strange correspondence between Dilts' and Burke's systems:

Dilts -- Burke
Identity = Agent
Values/Beliefs = Purpose
Capabilities = Agency
Behavior = Act
Environment = Scene

What does this have to do with work? Nothing. But anytime I see a parallel between two completely different sets of ideas, I think, right away, that there must be some underlying structure, whether innate, or cultural, which I've just bumped up against. In this case, I feel that either set of categories can be useful for thinking about your experience at work, and at play, whether you'd rather use the metaphor of the theater, or mathematical inclusion. Why not use both, in that case, since the opportunity is there to arrive at a binary coupling, from which a third set of your own can be derived. And how would that enable you to change the way you think about what you do?